Somalia has intensified its regional diplomacy in recent months, aligning more closely with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti in opposition to Ethiopia’s maritime deal with Somaliland—a pact that Mogadishu views as a direct threat to its sovereignty, according to a new geopolitical study published by E-International Relations on Sunday.
The report, written by Federico Donelli, an assistant professor of international relations at the University of Trieste, examines how the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding between Addis Ababa and Somaliland has escalated tensions across the Horn of Africa. Under the agreement, Ethiopia would gain Red Sea access through the port of Berbera and establish a naval base in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence—an outcome Somalia rejects outright.
“Somalia views any legal recognition of Somaliland’s independence as an existential threat,” Donelli writes in his study. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government launched a diplomatic campaign in response to the agreement, appealing to continental bodies such as the African Union, IGAD, and the East African Community while forming a closer bloc with Egypt, Eritrea, and Djibouti.
One of the most significant developments in that realignment came in August 2024, when Somalia and Egypt signed a bilateral defence pact. The agreement centred on Somalia’s call for the withdrawal of remaining Ethiopian peacekeepers operating under the African Union’s AUS-SOM mission. It also consolidated what Donelli refers to as an “anti-Ethiopian bloc,” grounded in overlapping regional grievances and long-standing rivalries.
Ethiopia’s maritime strategy, Donelli explains, is part of its “Grand Strategy of the Two Waters”—a policy shift aimed at expanding influence toward the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. With over 95 percent of its imports and exports flowing through Djibouti, Ethiopia spends up to $2 billion annually on port access.
Under the terms of the MoU, Ethiopia is expected to reroute 12 to 15 percent of its trade through Berbera, operated by Emirati logistics firm DP World since 2015. In exchange, Somaliland grants Ethiopia a 50-year lease to establish a naval base in Lughaya—reviving Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions after decades of being landlocked.
Donelli’s report also outlines how the MoU has deepened regional fault lines. Djibouti views Berbera port’s development under Emirati firm DP World’s management as a potential threat to its commercial dominance. Eritrea, once aligned with Ethiopia during the Tigray war, is wary of renewed maritime claims. Egypt, embroiled in a water rights dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), has seized the moment to expand its Red Sea influence and challenge Ethiopia’s dominance.
Extra-regional actors have also complicated the picture. The United Arab Emirates supports the MoU to protect its investments. Turkey maintains ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia, though Ankara remains publicly committed to Somali unity. France is increasing its presence in Djibouti as it shifts from West Africa to the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia opposes the deal, partly due to its rivalry with the UAE.
“Extra-regional actors do not directly cause conflict,” Donelli notes, “but their presence emboldens local players who then perceive their environment as more permissive.”
Somalia and Ethiopia signed the Ankara Declaration on December 11, 2024, in a move mediated by Turkey to reduce escalating tensions. The agreement does not reverse the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU but signals a shift from unilateral deals toward regional diplomacy. In doing so, it validates a key point in Donelli’s report: that extra-regional actors like Turkey are now shaping the strategic trajectory of the Horn of Africa—not only as investors and security partners, but as mediators.
According to the joint communiqué released by Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ankara Declaration lays out a framework for technical discussions to grant Ethiopia commercial access to Somali ports through mutual consent and legal channels.
Since the Ankara Declaration, diplomatic relations between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa have gradually improved. In early 2025, Somalia accepted Ethiopia’s offer to contribute troops to the African Union’s AUS-SOM mission, a move seen as a gesture of goodwill and a potential turning point in their previously strained relationship.
