By Moustafa Ahmad
As Somaliland and Taiwan deepen ties, Mogadishu has concurrently strengthened its relationship with Beijing as both recognized and unrecognized states vie for influence in the Horn of Africa.
Just one day after Taiwan’s deputy foreign minister, François Chihchung Wu, visited Somaliland to attend the inauguration of the newly elected president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, said that Beijing opposes ongoing contacts between Taiwan and Somaliland and urged all parties to “uphold the one-China principle,” expressing gratitude to Mogadishu for its compliance.
The next week, China’s special envoy to the Horn of Africa, Xue Bing, made a combative statement after a meeting with Somalia’s president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, one of the most aggressive yet by a Chinese official on the issue.
In an interview with the Somali National News Agency, Xue said: “We will not leave them alone if anyone dares to do anything to sabotage the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of China.” He also reassured officials in Mogadishu of Beijing’s support for their territorial unity while reiterating the warning to Taiwanese officials not to advance relations with Hargeisa.
These developments are the latest indication of how tensions between China and Taiwan are spilling over into and further complicating relations between Somalia and Somaliland.
While this has been Beijing’s position on Somaliland-Taiwan relations, it has become increasingly assertive in its approach to Hargeisa. On the other hand, Somaliland and Taiwan have strengthened their relations despite Somalia and China. Taiwan has announced the construction of a medical center in Hargeisa costing $22 million and also offered scholarships to military officers to modernize Somaliland’s military capabilities. In 2022, Somaliland and Taiwan signed the Energy and Mineral Resources Cooperation Agreement, which will allow for the exploration and drilling of energy and mineral resources.
How can we explain these dynamics in the context of the region’s shifting geopolitical allegiances, the incoming Trump administration in Washington, and speculation about increased engagement with Somaliland as part of broader geopolitical competition with China?
Since Somaliland and Taiwan opened representative offices in 2020, China has been vocal in its opposition to the new relationship, describing it as a violation of China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Beijing has subsequently strengthened ties with Somalia’s federal government, which rejects Somaliland’s sovereignty. This has led to increased diplomatic collaboration and the signing of numerous agreements aimed at bolstering relations between Beijing and Mogadishu. Among other objectives, this cooperation is intended to counter Somaliland and Taiwan.
China has since supported Somalia in international forums, including signing the United Nations resolution that lifted Somalia’s arms embargo. It has also provided Mogadishu with military support equipment to aid in combating terrorism and rebuilding its army. China has opposed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland on sea access. After meeting with Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation this year, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud secured a $28 million grant. China also donated 1,300 tonnes of food aid in a further effort to enhance its visibility and support for Somalia.
While China is not the only actor supporting Somalia in these matters, the rhetoric of sovereignty and territorial integrity has been frequently employed in bilateral engagements.
Essentially, the “One-Somalia” policy reflects and complements the “One-China” strategy, which has long shaped both countries’ international relations as they attempt to safeguard their claimed borders. “Somalia still signs on to the ‘One China’ policy, and likewise Beijing reciprocates with a one Somalia principle,” David Kiwuwa, a specialist on Africa-China relations and professor at the University of Nottingham’s Ningbo campus, told The New Arab.
Somalia has already severed diplomatic ties with nations that have publicly sought to engage Somaliland as an independent entity to force them to comply with its view of the situation. Since 2020, Somalia has cut ties with Kenya, Guinea, and the United Arab Emirates to move closer to Somaliland.
More recently, Mogadishu threatened companies with expulsion from Somali markets unless they removed the name Somaliland from their websites and promotional materials. “The crisis between Somalia and Somaliland has entered an unusual phase,” wrote Suhaib Mahmoud.
Similarly, China has faced issues with India, Estonia, and other nations due to their engagement with Taiwan and has made reversing this an important diplomatic priority. Nauru, an island country in Micronesia, was the most recent to sever ties with Taipei in favor of Beijing, joining 10 others that have done so since 2016, including Burkina Faso in 2018.
In a more recent setback for Taiwan, South Africa requested that Taipei move its representative office from the country’s political capital, Pretoria, to the commercial capital, Johannesburg, in October. South Africa said: “Relocating what will be rebranded as Trade Offices both in Taipei and in Johannesburg… will be a true reflection of the non-political and non-diplomatic nature of the relationship between the Republic of South Africa and Taiwan.”
Somaliland-Taiwan Deepening Ties
Both Hargeisa and Taipei are determined to break their diplomatic isolation. Since the ruling Kulmiye party took office in 2010, Somaliland has pursued a two-tiered diplomatic strategy. This approach has focused on establishing and maintaining bilateral relations with African, Asian, and West states through security cooperation, commercial partnerships, and similar initiatives. The second component of this strategy involves engaging in dialogue with Somalia, recognizing that communication with Somalia is a key factor in achieving international recognition.
This approach, driven by Western pressure—particularly from the United Kingdom—overturned a long-standing taboo in Somaliland against engaging in discussions with Somalia, a stance enforced by the previous presidents’ administrations, Mohamed I. Egal (1993 -2002) and Dahir Rayale Kahin (2003-2010).
Frustrated by the lack of progress in its diplomatic efforts and the failure of successive rounds of talks with Somalia, Somaliland decided to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Taiwan (officially the Republic of China) sought to strengthen its connections with Somaliland as part of its African expansion strategy. Taiwan had maintained diplomatic ties with the African continent since the early 1950s before the People’s Republic of China (PRC) assumed China’s United Nations seat in 1971 and established itself as China’s sole representative in international forums.
Incidentally, African countries, in general, played a key role in replacing Taiwan’s representation at the UN with officials from the Communist Party (CPC) in Beijing. The Global Times, for instance, which is run by the CPC’s newspaper, the People’s Daily, published an article highlighting the efforts of Somali officials, from Mohamed Ibrahim Egal to Abdullahi Issa, to secure Beijing’s inclusion at the UN.
Taiwan found an ally in Somaliland, which shared a similar political status, operated under a democratic governance system, and, most importantly, sought closer ties with the United States. Taiwan sees Somaliland as an ideal place in which it can demonstrate an alternative model of development based on cooperation and democracy, as opposed to what they consider “China’s Bad Governance Model for Africa.”
In this way, it seeks to counterbalance China’s expanding influence in Africa by seeking cooperative partnerships rather than asymmetric relationships, which create dependency. “We are here to teach people how to catch fish, not to just give them fish,” said Taiwanese representative to Somaliland Allen Lou.
Aggressive and assertive rhetoric has since characterized relations among all these actors. For instance, Somaliland has employed pro-western rhetoric to register its opposition to Chinese influence in the region. Chinese influence in the region.
President Bihi reportedly rejected the Chinese development package conditioned on Somaliland severing ties with Taiwan. High-level exchanges between Somaliland and Taiwan, such as a visit by a Somaliland delegation to Taipei in 2022, further underscored their defiance of calls from China and Somalia to abandon their partnership. Somaliland’s former foreign minister, Essa Kayd, when asked about ties between the countries, said: “We were born free, and China cannot dictate our relations.”
Trump, Irro, and Taiwan
The Horn of Africa will be at the center of increased geopolitical rivalry in the foreseeable future. Somaliland and Taiwan will maintain their ties, while China and Somalia will likely intensify their foreign policies to counter this. In November, Somaliland elected a new president, Abdirahman Irro, who pledged to strengthen diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Although Irro previously questioned these ties and called for closer relations with China, he later reversed his stance. Taiwan aims to deepen its ties with Somaliland through promises of enhanced economic and security cooperation.
The United States also plays a role. Under the Trump administration, the White House National Security Council openly acknowledged and praised the new relationship between Somaliland and Taiwan. Somaliland sought to leverage its ties with Taiwan to strengthen relations with the US, a strategy that proved successful. Conservative legislators in Congress and the Senate have advocated for increased engagement with Somaliland, citing its strategic location, democratic credentials, and links with Taiwan.
There are indications that the United States values the Somaliland-Taiwan connection and will likely encourage it during a second Trump term. In December, the US ambassador to Somalia visited Somaliland twice to strengthen relations with the new president.
China, meanwhile, has intensified its pressure on Somaliland as it strengthens security cooperation with Africa amid the US-China global rivalry, with the Horn of Africa serving as a key focal point. In January 2022, China appointed a special envoy for the Horn of Africa to advance its interests in the region, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to which Somalia is a signatory. Recently, China hosted what the Chinese embassy described as “friends” from the Las Anod region, an area that rebelled against Hargeisa’s rule and has been outside Somaliland’s control since August 2023. This was viewed as an assertive move targeting Somaliland, especially as it deepened ties with Taiwan.
China aims to maintain strong relations with a region characterized by unstable internal interrelations. This tests the ability of external players to maintain predictable and coherent policies towards states that appear friendly one moment and hostile the next and eager to recruit extra-regional support. For example, the MoU put Somalia and Ethiopia, previously strong partners, at loggerheads, while the Pretoria agreement to end the war in Tigray cost Addis Ababa an ally in Asmara.
Consequently, sustaining strong diplomatic ties in the region necessitates greater caution and pragmatism as geopolitical developments constantly alter the fluid friend-opponent matrix. Still, under Xi’s new “comprehensive national security” (总体国家安全) concept for China’s global engagements, Beijing has adopted a more ambitious approach than in the past, attempting to shape geopolitical landscapes rather than simply offer development assistance.
Beijing hosted the Horn of Africa Peace Initiative aimed at fostering peace, governance, and development in the region even though there was no discussion on regional conflicts. “This is the first time for China to play a role in security,” Xue Bing, Beijng’s Horn of Africa envoy said.
This reflects, as some have argued, the complex challenges of achieving lasting stability in the Horn of Africa. However, it also highlights the limitations of Chinese diplomacy in the region, as it has often sought to back incumbents or states involved in regional conflicts. For instance, China has supported Ethiopia’s central government in its war on Tigray, as well as taking similar positions in conflicts in Sudan and South Sudan. As a result, non-state or oppositional actors tend to view China as not being an impartial regional player.
Moustafa Ahmad is a researcher who specializes in the politics and security of Somaliland and the Horn of Africa. He can be reached on X @Mustafe_Ahmad.
