Abiy Ahmed’s visit to Mogadishu: A diplomatic dance or a shift away from Somaliland?

By: Bashe Awil Omar

 The recent visit of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to Mogadishu has once again sparked speculation about Ethiopia’s position on Somaliland. With the January 1, 2024, MoU still fresh in everyone’s minds, many are wondering whether Ethiopia is shifting its stance. The agreement suggested that Ethiopia might recognize Somaliland in exchange for access to the Red Sea, so Abiy’s visit to Somalia has raised a few eyebrows.

However, looking at the situation more closely, it’s clear that Ethiopia is not walking away from its engagement with Somaliland. Instead, Abiy’s trip to Mogadishu looks more like a diplomatic balancing act—reassuring Somalia while keeping Ethiopia’s long-term strategic interests firmly in place.

With June 2026 marking the end of his term, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is eager to solidify his position ahead of the next election. Strengthening ties with Ethiopia is one way to achieve this, especially as Somalia’s diplomatic relations with key regional players have remained fragile.

The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU caught Mogadishu off guard and left Hassan Sheikh scrambling for a response. The agreement was a big win for Somaliland, giving it direct engagement with Ethiopia. But more importantly, it highlighted a truth that Mogadishu has long tried to ignore— Somalia has no real influence over Somaliland.

By hosting Abiy in Mogadishu, Hassan Sheikh is trying to show that Somalia is still a key player in the region. He has reached out to Turkey, the Arab League, and the African Union, pushing them to help reverse Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland. But despite his efforts, no real action has been taken to change the situation.

For Abiy Ahmed, this visit wasn’t about choosing sides—it was about keeping Ethiopia’s options open. One of his key goals is to extend Ethiopia’s military presence in Somalia under ATMIS (formerly AMISOM). Ethiopia sees its troops in Somalia as an important security tool, helping to counter threats like Al-Shabaab while also maintaining influence in Mogadishu.

At the same time, Ethiopia has not renounced its MoU with Somaliland. Abiy is keeping both Mogadishu and Hargeisa engaged, ensuring that Ethiopia has multiple options when it comes to securing access to the sea. This approach allows Ethiopia to stay flexible while avoiding direct conflict with either side.

Despite all the political maneuvering, one thing remains clear—Somaliland is still Ethiopia’s most stable and reliable regional partner.

Unlike Somalia, which continues to struggle with instability, Somaliland has built a functioning democracy, maintained peace, and held multiple elections. It has done what Mogadishu has yet to achieve—creating a secure and self-governing state.

More importantly, Somaliland offers Ethiopia something no other regional player can—a reliable trade route through Berbera Port. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia needs stable and long-term access to international markets. Berbera provides a secure and strategic solution that Ethiopia simply cannot ignore.

Given all this, it’s hard to see Ethiopia walking away from its MoU with Somaliland. Even as Abiy seeks to manage his relationship with Somalia, Somaliland remains a key part of Ethiopia’s long-term strategy.

Abiy Ahmed’s visit may have caused speculation, but the facts haven’t changed—Ethiopia has not abandoned its agreement with Somaliland. Instead, Ethiopia is carefully navigating its relationships with both sides, making sure it doesn’t close any doors prematurely.

For Somaliland, this means the road to recognition is still open. The world is slowly starting to acknowledge Somaliland’s stability, governance, and economic potential. As long as Somaliland remains proactive, strengthens its diplomatic ties, and builds strong regional alliances, recognition is just a matter of time.

About the Author

Bashe Awil Omar is a diplomat and politician. He served as the Somaliland Representative to the UAE (from 2015-2018) and Kenya (from 2018-2021).